Non normative life events - phrase
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There is a familiar distinction in moral philosophy https://digitales.com.au/blog/wp-content/custom/african-slaves-during-the-nineteenth-century/possession-song.php deontological and consequentialist normative theories. Deontological theories place a significant emphasis on the idea that what matters, morally, is that individual agents perform or refrain from performing certain action-types, rather than promoting the occurrence, or non-occurrence of these action-types more generally.
Agent-Neutral Deontology?
The distinction between deontological and consequentialist normative theories is straightforward enough. Nevertheless, pace Thomas Nagel and David McNaughton and Piers Rawling, there is a long-standing project which seeks to demarcate the boundaries of deontology and consequentialism even further by defining deontology exclusively in terms of its agent-relativity.
Footnote 2 These rules can then be mapped to their corresponding normative theories, rendering all deontological normative theories agent-relative theories. Footnote 4.
The aim of this paper is to show that the demarcation project is problematic, and to defend both the logical possibility as well as the plausibility of an agent-neutral account of deontological restrictions. The success of the demarcation project and the agent-relativisation of deontology relies on drawing a formal distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative rules which seeks to accommodate non normative life events contrast two theoretically substantive and contentious intuitions. First, a predetermined agent-focused or agent-centredor agent-relative account of deontology where the numerical identity of the agent makes a difference to the deontic status of the act to the extent that agents have a particular interest in what they do as opposed to what they merely allow to happen in contrast to a victim-focused or victim-centredor victim-relative account of deontology grounded in the inviolable status of the would-be victim.
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And second, a predetermined agent-neutral account of consequentialism tied to an instrumental account of practical rationality where agent-neutral rules are defined as injunctions to either minimise or maximise. Footnote 5. Alternatively, the pre-theoretical distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative rules I defend in section non normative life events is free from these substantive considerations and is remarkably easy to articulate: namely, a distinction between universal rules which have a either a restricted or a wide scope of practical application.
Following McNaughton and Rawling, Hammerton draws a formal distinction between moral rules corresponding to the variable aims they give to individual agents:.
A rule expressing a moral requirement is agent-neutral iff it is not agent-relative. Footnote 6.
Agent-Relative Deontological Restrictions
Take, for instance, a deontological restriction that non normative life events anyone and everyone from killing innocent people even if doing so is the only way to prevent more killing of innocents by othersalongside its agent-neutral consequentialist counterpart requiring agents to minimise the killing of innocent people:. Footnote 7. Footnote 8 Direct-rule 1 is said to be an agent-relative deontological rule in virtue of the fact that it gives each agent a different, ultimate aim. Minimising-rule normativwon the other hand, is said to be an agent-neutral consequentialist rule in virtue of the fact that it gives each agent the same, ultimate aim.]
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